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THE ADVENT OF THE MULTIFACTOR,
SLIDING-SCALE STANDARD OF EQUAL
PROTECTION REVIEW: OUT WITH THE
TRADITIONAL THREE-TIER METHOD OF
ANALYSIS, IN WITH ROMER v. EVANS
I. INTRODUCTION
While few would have predicted Colorado to become the bat-
tleground over the divisive issue of homosexuality,' the conflict in
Colorado was not unexpected.2 Colorado is home to many conser-
vative religious denominations and organizations. At the same
time, however, Colorado was one of the first states to repeal its
antisodomy laws and enact laws prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of homosexuality.4
In 1992 ideologies clashed when the Colorado electorate was
asked to decide the fate of homosexuals through a referendum
measure designed to amend the Colorado Constitution. This
amendment, known as Amendment 2, would have prohibited ho-
mosexual orientation or relationships from forming the basis of
antidiscrimination laws and would have repealed all antidiscrimi-
nation laws in effect for homosexuals.5 At the polls on November
1. For the purpose of this Note, the terms "homosexuality" and "homosexual"
denote individuals of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation and conduct.
2. Dr. James Dobson, president of Focus on the Family-a conservative relig-
ious organization-labeled Colorado Springs the "'Gettysburg' of America's culture
war." Marc Cooper, Salvation City: God and Man in Colorado Springs, THE
NATION, Jan. 2, 1995, at 9.
3. See id. (stating that Colorado Springs, Colorado, has become the new capital
for America's Christian right and that more than 70 Christian organizations have
their headquarters in Colorado Springs); see also John Patrick Michael Murphy,
Amendment Would Balance Tax Burden, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 23, 1996, at
36A (citing the fact that "churches and religious organizations now own more than
80% of the value of privately-owned untaxed property in Colorado").
4. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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3, 1992, the majority of Colorado voters approved Amendment 2.6
After the election the battleground shifted from the voting
booths to the courts. In Romer v. Evand the United States Su-
preme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the amendment.
Few expected the case to be amenable to simple judicial analysis
because Amendment 2, by the Court's own admission, was
"unprecedented in our jurisprudence."8 Thus, it presented an im-
portant issue of equal protection law warranting careful and pre-
cise review by the Court. However, when the Court rendered its
decision, the only clear aspect of its opinion was the conclusion
that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.9 The Court's rationale and analytical
approach were both unclear. While the Court claimed to apply the
traditional framework of equal protection analysis, the result it
reached was inconsistent with the method it purported to employ."
This resulting inconsistency prompted some commentators to sug-
gest that the Court was disingenuous" or at least shallow in its
legal reasoning. 2
Despite the Court's problematic legal reasoning, Romer is a
decision with precedential value that will inevitably affect future
equal protection cases. Already some look upon the decision as
"the Court's most significant protection of gay rights ever,' 3 while
others read it as sending "'a clear message that legislative gay
6. Amendment 2 gained 53.4% of the popular vote. See discussion infra Part II.
7. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
8. Id. at 1628.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See discussion infra Part V.
11. See David Frum, Suspect Jurisprudence, WKLY. STANDARD, June 3, 1996, at
11, 12 ("In the end, Romer v. Evans is a bad judgment because it is a dishonest
one.").
12. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Is Judicial Restraint Dead?, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996,
at S25 [hereinafter Taylor, Judicial Restraint] ("Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
conspicuously failed to articulate a principled justification. His opinion was rooted
neither in original meaning nor in precedent, and provided little guidance for future
controversies."); Stuart Taylor Jr., Twisting and Turning on Gay Rights: Admirable
Decision in Landmark Case Marred by Superficial Reasoning, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., May 28, 1996, at 10 [hereinafter Taylor, Twisting and Turning] ("The
troubling thing about the 6-3 Romer decision is that the majestic generalities of Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion are surrounded by such crude, superficial,
and evasive legal reasoning .... ).
13. Richard C. Reuben, Gay Rights Watershed?: Scholars Debate Whether Past
and Future Cases Will be Affected by Supreme Court's Romer Decision, A.B.A. J.,
July 1996, at 30, 30.
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bashing will not be tolerated."' 14 There are yet others who believe
that the decision will eventually be limited to its facts.15 Neverthe-
less, no reliable prediction of the decision's impact can be made
without first articulating the legal theory upon which it is founded.
Therein, however, lies the challenge, for the Court left a void in its
legal reasoning that must be filled.
The need to explain the meaning of Romer has become urgent
in light of the new equal protection battlefield California voters
created by approving the anti-affirmative action initiative, Propo-
sition 209.16 Opponents of Proposition 209 have already filed suits
in federal court attacking its constitutionalit1.7 Their equal pro-
tection challenges rest, in part, on Romer. At the same time,
supporters of Proposition 209, who feel the initiative will not be
plagued by the difficulties encountered by Amendment 2, filed suit
in California state court to ensure implementation of the initia-
tive.' 9
The Proposition 209 battle is bound to be impassioned and
protracted, and Romer's meaning will be crucial to resolving this
equal protection conflict.2 Scholarship will play an important part
in deciphering Romer's meaning and its subsequent application to
Proposition 209 because superficial or sloppy judicial reasoning
14. Shannon P. Duffy, High Court Defends Gay Rights: Colorado Amendment
Makes Gays 'Unequal', THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 1996, at 1 (quoting
Andrew S. Park, executive director of the Center for Lesbian and Gay Law and
Public Policy).
15. See Reuben, supra note 13, at 30.
16. Proposition 209, the affirmative action initiative, amends the California Con-
stitution and prohibits the state, including cities, counties, public schools, and col-
leges, from discriminating or granting preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the areas of employment, public education, or
public contracting. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (amended 1996).
17. Their brief draws key phrases from Romer. Brief for Plaintiffs at 1, Coalition
for Economic Equity v. Wilson, No. C 96 4024 TEH (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Proposition
209 is 'a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.'; the propo-
sition places special burdens on minorities and women and cuts off their ability to
seek assistance and protection from the government).
18. See Howard Mintz, 209 Opponents Want Henderson to Hear Challenge, THE
RECORDER, Nov. 7, 1996, at 11 ("Plaintiffs' lawyers in the Prop 209 challenge are
pinning at least part of their hopes on ... Romer v. Evans.").
19. See id.
20. Although Proposition 209 is an amendment to the California Constitution,
Romer is binding precedent since the state cannot provide less protection than the
Federal Constitution. Arguably, Proposition 209 will be assailed by challengers as
providing less protection than mandated under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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often invites academic discussion. This Note accepts the invitation
extended by the Romer decision, and will ascertain the reasoning
that allowed the Court to find Amendment 2 violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Part II of this Note presents the background of Romer v.
Evans and its disposition in the Colorado courts. Part III provides
an overview of the equal protection standards of review under the
Fourteenth Amendment and establishes the framework against
which the Supreme Court's decision is later compared. Part IV
discusses the Court's holding and articulated reasoning. Part V
analyzes Amendment 2 and argues that the Court did not apply
the equal protection standard it purported to use. Part VI presents
three alternative theories to explain Romer. Part VII synthesizes
the holding and argues that the Court is moving away from current
equal protection standards of review as evinced by its implicit use
of a six-factor approach in reviewing Amendment 2. Finally, Part
VIII concludes that the Court has destabilized the current equal
protection framework in its attempt to transition toward a multi-
factor, sliding-scale approach in equal protection cases.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 1992 the Colorado Secretary of State received the
requisite number of qualified voter petitions necessary to present
the electorate with a new section to the Colorado Constitution21
This proposed constitutional amendment was Amendment 2, and
on November 3, 1992, they approved it by a margin of 813,966 to
710,151-53.4% to 46.6%.2 The amendment rescinded laws pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, conduct,
and practice at both state and local levels. Amendment 2 pro-
vided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or
Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado,
through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regula-
tion, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
21. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993).
22. See id. For an in-depth and thoughtful analysis of Amendment 2 and similar
legislation see Daniel A. Batterman, Evans v. Romer: The Political Process, Levels
of Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 915 (1995).
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bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status quota preferences, protected status or claim of dis-
crimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in
all respects self-executing.2
Individual and governmental plaintiffs 4 swiftly filed suit in
Colorado state district court to enjoin the enforcement of
Amendment 2.2 These plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction to forestall the scheduled January 15, 1993, implemen-
tation of the amendment,2 claiming that Amendment 2 denied
them equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.27
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the district
court, the plaintiffs had to show a reasonable probability that
Amendment 2 would be held unconstitutional in a full hearing on
the merits.' The district court found that Amendment 2 would
probably trigger strict scrutiny during a trial on the merits because
it implicated the fundamental right of an identifiable group "not to
have the State endorse and give effect to private biases." 2 Moreo-
23. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
24. Richard Evans and eight other persons comprised the group of individual
plaintiffs, while the County of Boulder, the Boulder Valley School District RE-2, the
City Council of Aspen, and the Cities of Denver, Boulder, and Aspen comprised the
group of governmental plaintiffs (collectively "plaintiffs"). See id. at 1270.
25. See Evans v. Romer, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,998, at 73,833 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. 1993).
26. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1273. The Colorado Constitution provides that
amendments passed through the initiative process "shall take effect from and after
the date of the official declaration of the vote... but not later than thirty days after
the vote has been canvassed." COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1. Since the Secretary of State
certified the results on December 16, 1992, Amendment 2 would have gone into
effect on January 15,1993. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272.
27. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1273.
28. The district court relied on Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 653-54
(Colo. 1982), which sets out the six-part test for the issuance of an injunction. See
Evans, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 73,835. Under this test the moving party must
establish:
(1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a danger of real,
immediate, and irreparable injury which may be prevented by injunctive
relief; (3) that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (4)
that the granting of a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public in-
terest; (5) that he balance of equities favors the injunction; and (6) that the
injunction will preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.
Rathke, 648 P.2d at 653-54 (citations omitted).
29. Evans, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 73,841
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ver, the court found that the plaintiffs had a reasonable probability
of proving that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." It therefore granted the preliminary injunction.3
On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the issuance
of the preliminary injunction.32 The court, however, disagreed as
to the fundamental right implicated. The fundamental right iden-
tified by the Colorado Supreme Court was the right to "participate
equally in the political process"33 and not whether the state was
giving effect to private biases as the district court concluded. Nev-
ertheless, since a fundamental right was implicated, the court con-
cluded that the appropriate standard of review was strict scrutiny. 4
At trial on the merits, the district court applied strict scrutiny
and found that only two of the six interests35 proffered by the state
in support of Amendment 2 were compelling.36 Nevertheless, the
court rejected the amendment because it was not narrowly tailored
to further the two compelling interests of religious privacy and
familial privacy.37 Therefore, it ordered that the preliminary in-
junction be made permanent. 8
Reviewing the issuance of the permanent injunction, the
Colorado Supreme Court found that Amendment 2 was not nar-
rowly tailored to serve any of the state's compelling interests and
affirmed the lower court's judgment.3 9  Failing strict scrutiny,
Amendment 2 was found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1286.
33. Id. at 1282.
34. See id at 1286.
35. The compelling state interests asserted at the district court were:
1) deterring factionalism; 2) preserving the integrity of the state's political
functions; 3) preserving the ability of the State to remedy discrimination
against suspect classes; 4) preventing the government from interfering with
personal, familial and religious privacy; 5) preventing government from
subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group; and 6) pro-
moting the physical and psychological well-being of... [the state's] chil-
dren.
Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 755 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1993). In
addition, the defendants argued that the people should be allowed to establish soci-
ety's public and moral norms and that the separate claims taken in the aggregate
presented a compelling state interest. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1346 & n.11.
36. See Evans, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 759.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 762.
39. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1350.
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III. MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A general understanding of the equal protection standards of
review is essential to fully appreciate the Romer holding and its
impact on the equal protection framework. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a firm command:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."" The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the
law must treat similarly situated persons similarly.4' However, the
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit state or federal gov-
ernments from classifying persons or drawing lines in the creation
and application of laws.42 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause
forbids classifications that arbitrarily burden a group of individu-
als.43
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the
power to enforce the equal protection mandate." However, in the
absence of controlling congressional direction, the United States
Supreme Court has formulated standards to assess the validity of
state legislation or other official action challenged as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause.45 These judicially created standards
used to examine the constitutionality of governmental legislation
are called "equal protection 'standards of review," '4 and they en-
tail an inquiry into the purpose of the suspect legislation.47
Presently, there are three traditional standards of review a
court uses in evaluating equal protection challenges: rational ba-
sis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny"--collectively called
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982).
42. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2, at 7 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter
ROTUNDA & NOWAK].
43. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause the courts have no duty to intervene "[u]nless a statute employs a classi-
fication that is inherently invidious."); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955) ("The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than
the invidious discrimination.").
44. Section 5 reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
45. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1985).
46. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.3, at 13.
47. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 366 (1949).
48. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3,
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the three-tier framework. In addition, there are newly-forming
nontraditional standards that warrant discussion.4 ' A meaningful
assessment of Romer and its impact on the traditional and novel
standards of equal protection review requires a thorough under-
standing of the current three-tier framework and especially a com-
prehensive understanding of rational basis review.
A. The Rational Basis Standard of Review
The most deferential standard, used most often to review leg-
islation, is the rational basis standard of review.0 It is the para-
digmatic standard of judicial restraint,51 as it attempts "'to preserve
to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to
function."'5 2 The United States Supreme Court has often stated
that rational basis analysis "is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices"53 nor an opportu-
nity for the judiciary to sit as a "superlegislature to judge the wis-
dom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in ar-
eas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along
suspect lines."'M The Court's rationale for this deferential standard
is that democratic processes can capably rectify improvident deci-
sions.5 As the Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical,6 "'the
people must resort to thepolls, not to the courts,' for protection
against legislative 
abuses.7u
Under the rational basis standard, legislation is presumed
valid if the "classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest."58 There are three major elements to
this standard: (1) the legitimate state interest; (2) the classifica-
tion; and (3) the rational relationship between the two.
1. The legitimate state interest
With respect to legitimate state interests, courts generally
at 601-02 (5th ed. 1995).
49. See discussion infra Part III.D.
50. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
51. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,314 (1993).
52. Id. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
365 (1973)).
53. Id. at 313.
54. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303 (1976) (per curiam).
55. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
56. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
57. Id. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
58. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
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afford state legislatures wide latitude and impute a strong pre-
sumption of validity to their enactments, particularly when they
are social or economic in nature.59 For example, in City of New
Orleans v. Dukes a New Orleans ordinance prohibited pushcart
vendors from operating in the French Quarter of the city.6' The
ordinance, however, exempted pushcart vendors who had operated
in the city for eight continuous years. 2 Nonexempt vendors ar-
gued that the ordinance impermissibly discriminated between ven-
dors with more than eight years of experience and those 
with less. s
The Court found that the ordinance was "aimed at enhancing the
vital role of the French Quarter's tourist-oriented charm in the
economy of New Orleans." 64 The Court reaffirmed its deferential
review of economic legislation and upheld the ordinance.65
Although the judiciary affords legislatures wide latitude in the
creation of economic and social legislation, there still remain
certain legislative goals that do not constitute legitimate overn-
mental interests. For instance, in Shapiro v. Thompson Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia had enacted
legislation conditioning the receipt of welfare assistance upon an
applicant's residency in the state for at least one year prior to filing
for assistance.6 In defense of the residency requirement, the states
argued that the Court should sustain the classification between
one-year-or-more residents and other residents because of the dif-
ference in tax payments each group made to the states s. 6 Rejecting
this contention, the Court held that a state's objective of rewarding
its citizens for past contributions was not a legitimate state pur-
pose. 9 The Court noted that such reasoning would permit states
59. See id.; see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) ("'In the area
of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."' (quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970))); Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303 ("When
local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection
Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirabil-
ity of particular statutory discriminations.").
60. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
61. See id. at 298.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 305.
64. Id. at 303.
65. See id. at 305.
66. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
67. Id. at 622-27.
68. See id. at 632.
69. See id. at 632-33
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"to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries, or deprive
them of police and fire protection . . . . The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services." 70
The Court in USDA v. Moreno7' invalidated another proffered
legitimate state interest. In Moreno households that were denied
financial aid brought an equal protection challenge against the
Food Stamp Act of 1964.72 The Act denied federal assistance to
any household containing an individual unrelated to any other
member of the household.7 Finding that Congress intended to
prevent "hippies" from receiving food stamp aid, the Court held
that "if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest."74
In contrast to the general socioeconomic enactments enunci-
ated above is the question of whether morality may constitute a
legitimate state interest. The Court addressed this issue in Bowers
v. Hardwick,75 which examined whether a Georgia statute criminal-
izing consensual sodomy violated the Due Process Clause.76 The
defendant challenged the state's antisodomy statute arguing that
the United States Constitution confers the right to autonomy in
consensual sexual activity between adults, or in the alternative,
that no rational basis existed for the statute.n The Court applied
the rational basis standard of review since the Georgia statute did
not impinge a fundamental right.7 In upholding the statute, the
Court rejected the defendant's argument that "the presumed belief
70. Id.
71. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
72. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1964), as amended by 84 Stat. 2048 (1971).
73. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
74. Id. at 534.
75. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
76. See id. at 186-89. Though technically not an equal protection case, challenges
under due process are analyzed in a substantially similar fashion as fundamental
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (acknowledging that lower federal courts have used princi-
ples embodied in the Due Process Clause in assessing the constitutionality of state
and local enactments under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); see also Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium:
"Old Formulations" or "New Articulations"?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 337, 378
n.211 (1994) (similar analysis is applied to both due process and equal protection
claims).
77. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
78. See id. at 191-96.
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of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy
is immoral and unacceptable" was not a legitimate state interest.
71
Instead, the Court stated that the law is "constantly based on
notions of morality" and that the sodomy laws of some twenty-five
states should not be invalidated because they are predicated on
such notions of morality.0 -
2. The classification
If a court identifies a legitimate state interest, the next step
under rational basis review is an examination of the employed
classification. Although the Equal Protection Clause mandates
similar treatment for similar persons," this does not require the
similar treatment of things that are different in fact or opinion.8
Instead, courts determine whether the classification is itself arbi-
trary or irrational since such a classification is inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment.8
This determination begins by looking at the individuals af-
fected by the classification.s When the classification excludes
similar persons who should be grouped together, the classification
is considered underinclusive. On the other hand, when a classifi-
cation includes persons who are in fact disparate, the classification
is considered overinclusive."6 Finally, classifications may be both
overinclusive and underinclusive.8 While the scope of the classifi-
cation is helpful for analysis, it does not singularly determine
whether the classification is arbitrary and thereby invalid.
79. Id. at 196.
80. Id.
81. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982).
82. See id.
83. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-04; F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412,415 (1920).
84. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.2, at 9-10.
85. See id. at 10. The Court's decision in Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Cole-
man, 277 U.S. 32 (1928), provides an example of an arbitrary, underinclusive classifi-
cation. In Louisville a Kentucky statute levied a tax of twenty cents per hundred
dollars on any form of indebtedness secured by a mortgage in the state not maturing
within five years. See id. at 35. The Court held that the classification was arbitrary,
reasoning that since those with indebtedness securities maturing within five years
were not taxed, they received a gratuity. See id. at 38-39. Although the state could
have exacted less tax from this group, the statute violated the equal protection guar-
antee by not charging them any tax at all. See id. at 39.
86. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.2, at 10.
87. See id. at 11-12.
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3. The rational relationship between the classification and the
legitimate state interest
If the court finds both a nonarbitrary classification and a le-
gitimate state interest, it then determines whether there is a ra-
tional relationship between the two. This element of the rational
basis standard is the most flexible, often highly susceptible to sub-
tle recasting or recharacterization. The Supreme Court itself ad-
mitted that it has not been altogether consistent in its pronounce-
ments in this area." To better understand the Court's
inconsistency in this area, it is helpful to view its decisions as fal-
ling along a spectrum. At one end the Court is highly inclined to
find a rational basis, and at the other end it exhibits an aversion to
the same.
In decisions where a finding of rational basis is most likely, the
Court has said that a classification is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest if "any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it."" For example, in Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York9° the Court upheld a New York traffic
regulation prohibiting advertising vehicles while allowing adver-
tisements on business delivery vehicles, reasoning that "[t]he local
authorities may well have concluded that [advertisements on busi-
ness trucks] do not present the same traffic problem in view of the
nature or extent of the advertising which they use."9' The Court
recently reiterated this deferential approach when it stated that a
law withstands an equal protection challenge if there is "any rea-
sonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational ba-
sis for the classification. ' 2
In decisions where a finding of rational basis is less likely, the
Court has stated that "for a classification to be valid under the
Equal Protection Clause... it 'must rest upon some ground of dif-
ference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation." 9 For example, in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia,94 Virginia assessed a tax on income generated by Virginia
88. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
89. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
90. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
91. Id. at 110.
9Z Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
93. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174-75 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415).
94. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
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corporations doing business both within and outside the state.9s
However, corporations that were merely incorporated under state
law but conducted no business within the state were exempt.96 The
Court held that the tax laws were not fairly or substantially related
to the state's objective of providing governmental protection to
corporations."' The exempt Virginia corporations, conducting no
business within the state, were accorded the same protection as
other Virginia corporations that were taxed on all income gener-
ated within and outside the state.9 Thus, the Court held that the
differentiation between the two types of corporations was arbitrary
and irrational.9 It is important to note that while the Court some-
times discusses the fair or substantial object of the legislation, the
Court does not require the conceived reason for the challenged
distinction to have actually motivated the legislature.'O°
There are also decisions that fall closer to the middle of the
spectrum, finding "plausible reasons" for disparate treatment
rather than any conceivable explanation."' For example, in United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz2 railroad employees
challenged the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974,13 which sought to
eliminate a loophole in the retirement system whereby certain
employees received a windfall in benefits.! Congress devised an
elaborate scheme to determine which employees would receive the
railroad pension in addition to social security benefits. It decided
that only those employees demonstrating a continued relationship
with the railroad as of the switch-over date, January 1, 1974, would
receive benefits. °5
The plaintiffs argued that Congress's distinction between rail-
95. See id. at 413.
96. See id. at 414.
97. See id. at 416.
98. See id. at 415-16.
99. See id. at 417.
100. See Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. In Beach Communications
Congress provided for regulation of cable television facilities by drawing a distinc-
tion between facilities serving separately-owned buildings and those serving one or
more buildings under common ownership. See id. at 309. The Court upheld the
common-ownership distinction because it was rationally related to the governmental
purpose of preventing the cost of regulation from outweighing the benefits to con-
sumers although this was not the stated purpose of the legislation. See id. at 317.
101. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179.
102. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
103. 45 U.S.C. § 231.
104. See id. at 166-67.
105. See id. at 171.
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road employees on the basis of whether they had a "current con-
nection" with the railroad industry as of the switch-over date was
irrational.'O° The Court disagreed, reasoning that employees hav-
ing a current connection with the industry were probably among
the class of career railroad operators for whom Congress designed
the Railroad Retirement Act."
Despite the divergent decisions along this rational basis spec-
trum, a few principles remain constant. First, neither Congress nor
the states have an "obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification."'' 8 Second, those challeng-
ing legislation on equal protection grounds have the burden to
"negative every conceivable basis which might support [the classi-
ficationI."' 9 Third, legislatures are not required to articulate their
reasons for enacting a statute.n0 Lastly, under rational basis re-
view a classification does not fail merely because it "is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.""' These enduring principles demonstrate just how
easily an enactment can survive rational basis review.
B. The Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review
Strict scrutiny stands in stark contrast to rational basis review.
It is a heightened level of scrutiny that differs from rational basis
review because the judiciary does not defer to the decision of the
legislature. Rather, courts conduct an independent review of the
challenged classification and employ a more exacting test."3 For a
challenged enactment to withstand strict scrutiny, it must be nar-
rowly tailored "to serve a compelling state interest.""' 4 Because
strict scrutiny is a form of independent review by the courts, even
if the government can demonstrate a compelling end, a court will
not uphold the legislation unless it concludes that the classification
106. Id. at 173-74.
107. See id. at 178.
108. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); see also Beach Communications, 508
U.S. at 315 ("[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.").
109. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315).
110. See Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315.
111. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78.
112. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.3, at 15.
113. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985) (stating that rational basis review gives way to heightened review when a
classification involves race, alienage, or national origin).
114. Id. (1985) (emphasis added).
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is narrowly tailored to promote that compelling interest. The as-
sumption underlying rational basis-that the democratic process
will rectify improvident legislative enactments-does not apply to
strict scrutiny because the enactments that trigger strict scrutiny
reflect a form of antipathy and prejudice the democratic process
cannot correct.1 6 Therefore, judicial intervention-in the form of
strict scrutiny-is the last bastion for the equal protection guaran-
tee.
1 7
Classifications in socioeconomic legislation generally do not
trigger strict scrutiny. Instead, strict scrutiny is triggered when a
classification implicates a fundamental right or involves some sus-
pect basis."'
The courts determine which rights are fundamental by looking
at whether the right at issue has its source explicitly or implicitly in
the Constitution. '9 Under this approach the Court has identified,
among others, the fundamental right to an appeal in criminal
cases 12 and the right to interstate travel.2 1 Yet, despite the Consti-
tution's guidance, the Court sometimes recognizes rights not ex-
plicitly protected by the Constitution. For example, in Dunn v.
Blumstein,'2 the Court recognized the right to participate equally
in state elections even though the right to vote is not expressly pro-
tected by the Constitution.'57
Classifications grounded in suspect bases also receive strict
scrutiny. Unlike fundamental rights that generally have their
source in the Constitution, the suspect basis delineation is a judi-
cial construction that stems from Justice Stone's famous footnote
in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,'24 which stated that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" should trigger
independent review.' 5 Footnote four has become the paradigm for
115. See ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 42, § 18.3, at 15.
116. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
117. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969)
(stating the necessity for careful scrutiny by the Court in evaluating voter participa-
tion and the inapplicability of the rational basis assumption in strict scrutiny review).
118. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.3, at 15.
119. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,217 n.15 (1982).
120. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
121. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
122. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
123. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.15 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
124. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
125. See id. at 153 n.4 ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
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heightened equal protection scrutiny. 26 Currently, classifications
based on race, 27 alienage,'2 and nationality129 are considered sus-
pect and subjected to strict scrutiny.
130
C. The Intermediate Standard of Review
The two-tier standard detailed above was expanded in the late
1960s with the introduction of intermediate review.3 1 As a form of
heightened review, it involves far less deference to the legislature
than does rational basis but requires a less compelling interest than
strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny a classification will
only be upheld if it is substantially related to a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest.33 Unfortunately, the Court does not
always articulate this standard consistently, for it has sometimes
held that the proper test is whether there is an "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" for the classification, rather than merely a
substantial government interest. 34
Classifications involving quasi-suspect groups trigger inter-
mediate scrutiny. Quasi-suspect groups are groups that share
some characteristic of a suspect group; yet, because they do not
qualify as "discrete and insular minorit[ies]," they only receive in-
termediate review instead of strict scrutiny. 3 5 Currently, only two
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
126. See Stephen Zamansky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals'
Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REv. 221,225 (1993).
127. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) ("[C]lassification[s]
based upon ... race.., must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination ema-
nating from official sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial classifica-
tions 'constitutionally suspect,' and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny."' (citations
omitted)).
12& See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("[Cjlassifications based
on alienage ... are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.").
129. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (1973).
130. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
131. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.3, at 16.
132. See id. at 17.
133. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
134. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); see also, e.g., Karen
Kupetz, Note, Equal Benefits, Equal Burdens: "Skeptical Scrutiny" for Gender Clas-
sifications After United States v. Virginia, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1333 (1997)
(discussing the distinction between the two forms of intermediate scrutiny review).
135. See Sande Buhai Pond, No Dogs Allowed: Hawaii's Quarantine Law Violates
the Rights of People with Disabilities, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 145, 191-92 (1995).
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classifications have been accorded intermediate scrutiny: those
based on gender ' and those based on the legitimacy of children.1 37
D. Novel and Emerging Standards of Equal Protection Review
Novel standards have emerged in recent times that resist easy
classification within the three-tier framework of equal protection
review. In general, they tend to be independent forms of judicial
review that accord heightened scrutiny. The three novel standards
that impact the Romer decision are: (1) the per se standard; (2)
the rational basis with teeth standard; and (3) the multifactor,
sliding-scale theory.138
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF
ROMER V. EVANS
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, affirmed
the Colorado Supreme Court's judgment and struck down
Amendment 2 as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.39 The Court, however, did not rely upon
the rationale of the state court for its affirmance' 4° In a three-part
opinion the Court described the antecedent events giving rise to
Amendment 2, evaluated its far-reaching effect on the status of
homosexuals, and determined the amendment's unconstitutional-
ity.
A. The Supreme Court's Version of the Conflict in Colorado
The Court began by discussing the statewide controversy that
was the impetus for Amendment 2.'14 Various municipalities had
passed ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the areas of housing, employment, education, public
accommodation, and health and welfare services.' 42 The electorate
responded with Amendment 2, which attempted to repeal these
ordinances to the extent they prohibited "discrimination on the
136. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
137. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, § 18.3, at 17.
138. Part VI of this Note presents these theories, discusses the application of each
to Romer, and then comments on their desirability as standards of equal protection
review.
139. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
140. See id. at 1624.
141. See id. at 1623.
142. See id.
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basis of 'homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships."'1 43  However, the Court felt that
Amendment 2 worked more than a mere repeal of these existing
provisions for homosexuals. The Court found that Amendment 2
prohibited "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level
of state or local government designed to protect ... homosexual
persons."' 44 Having reached this conclusion, the Court devoted the
rest of its opinion to a discussion of the impact this broad enact-
ment would have on homosexuals' legal status and equal protec-
tion under the laws of Colorado.
B. The Change in Legal Status Created by Amendment 2'45
In Part II of its opinion, the Court examined Amendment 2's
impact on the legal status of homosexuals. The Court explained
that under common law those who served the public, like innkeep-
ers and smiths, could not refuse service to a customer without good
reason.1"4 However, this common law duty proved to be insuffi-
cient. 4' Congress could not remedy the common law's shortcom-
ings because the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress
the general power to prohibit public accommodation discrimina-
tion. 48 As a result of the deficiencies, many states enacted statutes
to counter discrimination.149  These statutes differed from the
common law in that they enumerated the persons who were under
a duty not to discriminate 50 as well as the groups or persons within
the ambit of statutory protection.'5' At the time of Amendment 2's
passage, Colorado had many such statutes prohibiting various
143. Id. (citing COLO. CONSr., art. II, § 30(b)).
144. Id.
145. Although this Note presents the Court's discussion of legal status, the analy-
sis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
146. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.
147. See id.
148. See id, (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
149. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.
150. See id The Court stated that under current Colorado law those persons or
entities subject to a duty not to discriminate include "any place of business engaged
in any sales to the general public and any place that offers services, facilities, privi-
leges, or advantages to the general public or that receives financial support through
solicitation of the general public or through governmental subsidy of any kind." Id.
151. See id. According to the Court, Colorado antidiscrimination laws set forth a
catalogue of traits including "age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parent-
hood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability...
[and] sexual orientation." Id. at 1626.
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types of discrimination.5
The Court found that Amendment 2 radically altered common
law and statutory protections."' The amendment effectuated a
"[s]weeping and comprehensive" change in the legal status of ho-
mosexuals. 54  It precluded homosexuals from statutory protec-
tion,155 placed them into a "solitary class," and denied them legal
protection from discrimination with respect to transactions and
relations in both private and governmental spheres. 56 In so hold-
ing, the majority explicitly rejected the state's principal argument
that Amendment 2 merely placed homosexuals in the same posi-
tion as all other persons and that the amendment did no more than
deny homosexuals "special rights."'l'
To the contrary, the majority cited the Colorado Supreme
Court's finding that at a minimum, Amendment 2 repealed
"existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and
local entities that barred discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion."'' 8 The amendment's "ultimate effect" was to "prohibit any
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective"
measures designed to protect homosexuals "unless the state consti-
tution [was] first amended to permit such measures."'5 9
The Court's greatest concern with Amendment 2 was its ex-
tensive reach.16 The amendment was so broad that it not only de-
prived homosexuals of the specific laws passed for their protection,
but also dispossessed them of protection from the general laws and
policies designed to prohibit any form of arbitrary discrimination
in either the private or governmental sectors.1 61 "At some point,"
Justice Kennedy stated, "in the systematic administration of
152. See id. at 1624-25.
153. See id. at 1626.
154. Id. at 1625.
155. Amendment 2 "nullifies specific legal protections ... [for homosexuals] in all
transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services,
private education, and employment." Id. at 1626.
156. See id. at 1625.
157. See id. at 1624.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1625 (emphasis added) (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85
& n.26 (Colo. 1993)).
160. During oral argument the Court repeatedly asked the parties if homosexuals
would receive protection from police and other social services and whether homo-
sexuals would have recourse for "gay bashing." Transcript of Oral Argument at *27,
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 605822 [hereinafter
Oral Argument].
161. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
April 1997] 1295
1296 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
[general applicability laws], an official must determine whether
homosexuality is an arbitrary and thus forbidden basis for decision.
Yet a decision to that effect would itself amount to a policy pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexuality."'' To Justice
Kennedy this course of action would appear to be invalid under
Amendment 2.1
Even assuming that homosexuals could find protection in the
general laws of Colorado, the Court found that Amendment 2 not
only "compound[ed] the constitutional difficulties" present in the
law,'6 but imposed a special disability upon homosexual persons
by denying them the "safeguards that others enjoy[ed] ... without
constraint.",16
C. Amendment 2's Failure to Satisfy Rational Basis Review
The majority concluded the opinion by analyzing Amendment
2 under the equal protection guarantee.'6 The majority began by
saying that the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equal pro-
tection of the laws does not mean that laws can never classify or
disadvantage a certain group of people.'67 Such legislative classifi-
cations will not violate the Equal Protection Clause if they bear a
"rational relation to some legitimate end. 1 68
While the Court evoked the traditional rational basis test, it
held that the amendment failed-even defied-this conventional
test.169 The two reasons given for this failure marked the Court's
departure from the traditional equal protection framework. The
Court's first reason was that the amendment constituted an invalid
form of legislation because it imposed a "broad and undifferenti-
ated disability on a single named group"; and second, the amend-
ment seemed "inexplicable by anything but animus" toward the
class affected. 70
1. Amendment 2: an invalid form of legislation
The Court's first reason for rejecting Amendment 2 was that it
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1627.
166. See id. at 1627-29.
167. See id. at 1627.
168. Id; see also discussion supra Part III.A.
169. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
170. Id.
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constituted an invalid form of legislation. The Court noted that
the link between the classification and the legitimate state objec-
tive gives substance to the equal protection guarantee.17 ' The
search for this link provides "guidance and discipline for the legis-
lature" and also marks the limits of the judiciary's authority.
172
Even unwise or disadvantageous laws can ordinarily be sustained
on tenuous rationale if the classification bears a rational relation-
ship to an independent and legitimate legislative end.73 This rela-
tionship ensures that the "classifications are not drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."' 74
Laws that are "narrow enough in scope and grounded in a suffi-
cient factual context" aid the Court in ascertaining the existence of
some rational relationship between the classification and the pur-
pose served. 75
This method of equal protection review set out by the Court
does not conform to the traditional framework. The Court devi-
ated in two significant ways. First, the Court has not traditionally
required both an independent and legitimate state end; generally,
only some legitimate state interest is required.'76 The Court's
added requirement of an independent interest seems to imply that
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id. It is important to note that the Court's phrasing of the rational basis
standard as requiring both a legitimate and independent state interest for the classifi-
cation is a departure from the traditional rational basis test, which requires only a
legitimate state interest. See id. However, the Court's phrasing is not without some
support. In United States Department of Agriculture. v. Moreno the Court held that a
"purpose to discriminate against [a politically unpopular group] cannot, in and of it-
self and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public inter-
est, justify [the enactment.]" United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534-35 (1973) (second alteration in original). For a discussion of the Court's refer-
ence to the unpopular status of homosexuals, see infra Part VI.C.2.b.
174. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
175. Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited four cases: New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976) (classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity jus-
tified because of tourism benefits); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955) (favoring of optometrists over opticians justified based on assumed hypotheti-
cal grounds); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)
(exemption from general advertising ban justified based on the lower potentiality of
traffic hazards); and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552
(1947) (possible efficiency and safety benefits of a closely knit pilotage system justi-
fied licensing scheme disfavoring persons unrelated to current river boat pilots). See
id. In these cases the factual context and scope of the enactments were sufficient to
uphold the challenged legislation. The Court's position in Romer marks a departure
from the traditional rational basis test.
176. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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the regulation of a particular classification itself could not consti-
tute the state's legitimate interest; rather, the state's interest must
stand apart from the classification itself and can only indirectly
burden the affected classification.1' Second, the Court's need to
know the factual context represents a deviation from the tradi-
tional rational basis test, which does not require an actual set of
facts.17 1 Instead, traditional rational basis allows the Court to
imagine hypothetical reasons and situations.
179
Nevertheless, the Court viewed Amendment 2 as an invalid
form of legislation because it compounded the "normal process of
judicial review" by simultaneously being "too narrow and too
broad."'' " By identifying persons by a single trait-
homosexuality-the amendment denied them "protection across
the board" and resulted in a "disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law."1 'Ms
was found to be the "broad and undifferentiated disability" placed
upon homosexuals by Amendment 2."2 It was for this reason that
the Court viewed Amendment 2's classification as
"unprecedented" in American jurisprudence, calling for special
consideration."'
The majority of the Court felt that Amendment 2 was not
within our constitutional tradition because it impugned a central
idea of the equal protection guarantee that "government and each
of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assis-
tance.'' The Court explained that respect for this principle is
why "laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored
legal status or general hardships are rare." 's The majority deter-
mined that a law which makes it harder for one group of citizens to
177. However the Court's new analysis would appear to invalidate some impor-
tant legislation. For example, if a characteristic causing a person to be classified a
certain way can never form the state's legitimate interest, states are barred from pro-
tecting the physically or mentally disabled since laws relating to their protection de-
rive from the fact that certain traits set such people apart or into separate categories.
See infra text accompanying notes 382-85.
178. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,320 (1993).
179. For example, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
109-10 (1949), the Court used hypothetical traffic concerns in its rational basis
analysis.
180. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1627.
183. See id. at 1628.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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seek aid from the government is "a denial of equal protection of
the laws in the most literal sense"'86 because the promise of equal
protection is "a pledge of the protection of equal laws."' 7
2. Amendment 2's animus
The majority rejected Amendment 2 for a second reason: no
legitimate purpose or discrete objective could be identified for its
enactment."' The Court found that the amendment raised the
"inevitable inference" that the imposed disadvantage was born of
animosity towards homosexuals. 8 The Court stated that "a bare
... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest."" Although incidental disad-
vantages stemming from broad and ambitious laws can be justified
if they are tied to legitimate public policy,' this could not be said
for Amendment 2 because it inflicted an actual and continuing in-
jury without any legitimate justification.'9 In short, the Court
concluded that Amendment 2's classification was not based on a
legitimate state interest from which it could discern a rational re-
lationship. 93
The Court's conclusion called for the rejection of two of the
state's rationales for Amendment 2: first, that the amendment
protected the freedom of association, particularly for landlords or
employers who might have religious or personal objections to ho-
mosexuality; and second, that it conserved resources to fight dis-
crimination against other groups.' 94 Both justifications were so far
removed from the breadth of Amendment 2 that the Court found
them implausible.95 Because the Court could not identify any le-
gitimate purpose or discrete objective for Amendment 2, 9' it con-
sidered the amendment a "status-based enactment divorced from
any factual context from which [it] could discern a relationship to
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
188. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
189. See id. at 1628.
190. Id. (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1628-29.
193. See id. at 1629.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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legitimate state interests"; ' 97 in essence, it was "a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake." '  The Court ultimately
concluded that Amendment 2 intended to make homosexuals une-
qual to all other citizens. 99 The Court struck down the amend-
ment because "[a] State cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws" without violating the Equal Protection
Clause.m
V. THE COURT'S PROBLEMATIC EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Many commentators have labeled the Court's opinion conclu-
sory,201 incoherent, 22 and superficial.23 That the Court did not ex-
plain why the amendment failed to satisfy rational basis review
may have fueled much of this criticism. With one sentence the
Court dismissed the proffered state interestse 4 and with another
concluded that the amendment lacked a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.25 In light of the Court's vagueness, it is
appropriate to conduct a systematic analysis of Amendment 2 to
determine whether the Court was correct in holding that the
amendment fails traditional rational basis review.
A. Does Amendment 2 Truly Fail Rational Basis Review?
Romer's most problematic section, Part III, contains the
Court's equal protection analysis of Amendment 2. Under current
equal protection law, if an enactment does not implicate a suspect
basis or a fundamental right, the reviewing court evaluates it to de-
termine whether the classification bears a rational relation to some
legitimate state interest.2" The Romer Court applied this rational
basis standard to Amendment 2 and concluded that the amend-
197. Id. at 1629.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See Chai Feldblum, Based on a Moral Vision, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at
S31.
202. See Reuben, supra note 13, at 30 (quoting Michael McConnell, a legal scholar
at the University of Chicago Law School).
203. See Taylor, Twisting and Turning, supra note 12.
204. "The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular
[state] justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1629.
205. "[A] law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose, and Amendment 2 does not." Id. (citation omitted).
206. See id at 1627 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,319-20 (1993)).
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ment failed to satisfy the standard. Unfortunately, the three basic
components of its analysis-the legitimate state interest, the clas-
sification, and the rational relation between the two-were only
partially addressed and spread throughout the section in a disor-
ganized fashion. Moreover, the Court employed novel elements in
207
its analysis not traditionally part of rational basis review.
1. The legitimate state interest
Under rational basis review, the state merely needs to estab-
lish a legitimate interest that is rationally related to its classifica-
tion.0 8 One of Colorado's asserted interests was the protection of
its citizens' freedom of association.29  It argued that without
Amendment 2, freedom of association would be compromised be-
cause landlords or employers would be forced to accommodate
homosexuality even though they harbored religious or personal
objections to that lifestyle.20 Although the state presented free-
dom of association as its legitimate interest, the reference to relig-
ious beliefs suggests an implicit underlying moral basis.21  Lending
credence to this is that, at the lower court level, the state argued it
had a compelling governmental interest in "allowing the people
themselves to establish public social and moral norms. 2 12 In short,
securing majoritarian morality emerges as the state's true interest
for Amendment 2.
However, the majority makes no mention of morality nor does
it acknowledge the concept of traditional societal mores in its
opinion.1 3 It skirts this issue entirely by saying, "[t]he breadth of
the Amendment is so far removed from [the freedom of associa-
tion] that we find it impossible to credit [it]. '214 The Court avoids
discussing morality because it cannot identify morality as the basis
of the amendment and then fail to find it a legitimate state interest
207. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
208. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
209. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
210. See id.
211. See Feldblum, supra note 201, at S32 ("The Court's reticence may have de-
rived from the fact that any deeper analysis would have required it to engage more
directly with the question of the people's right to legislate based on private moral-
ity.").
212. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 (Colo. 1994) (emphasis added).
213. See Feldblum, supra note 201, at S31 (The Court was "deficient in its refusal
to meet the dissent's central point regarding the role of government in legislating on
the basis of popular morality.").
214. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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because this would contradict its holding in Bowers v. Hardwick . 5
Ten years earlier in Bowers, the Court found that morality consti-
tuted a legitimate interest and that the state could, on that basis,
criminalize consensual sodomy. 6 In upholding the Georgia anti-
sodomy law, the Bowers Court explained that the "law... is con-
stantly based on notions of morality.,
217
The conspicuous absence of any mention of Bowers has be-
come a source of frustration for many commentators. Moreover,
the Court's failure to address Bowers motivated the dissent to
criticize the majority. In his dissent Justice Scalia used Bowers to
argue that if a state could constitutionally criminalize homosexual
sodomy, a fortiori a state could constitutionally prohibit all levels
of its government from "bestowing special protections upon homo-
sexual[s]. '' 219 Unfortunately the majority chose not to engage the
dissent on this point and has left the value of Bowers uncertain. 2
Yet, even if morality were not the underlying basis of
Amendment 2, the Court still should have concluded that a legiti-
mate state interest existed. In its strict scrutiny analysis of
Amendment 2, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the state
may have a compelling interest in securing the associational free-
dom of its citizens.22 The state supreme court found, however,
that Amendment 2 was not narrowly tailored to further the inter-
est in associational privacy.2 Because the standard of review
changed under the Romer Court's analysis, the shift from strict
scrutiny to rational basis review should have made it easier for the
state to meet its burden of showing a legitimate interest. Under
rational basis a state need not show that its interest be compelling
or its means narrowly tailored.m Since the United States Supreme
Court did not manifest a contrary belief, the compelling interest
the Colorado Supreme Court found in associational freedom at a
215. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
216. See id. at 196.
217. Id.
218. See Tom Stoddard, The High Court Erases a Stigma, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1996,
at A19.
219. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. But see Reuben, supra note 13, at 30 ("'[T]he majority has overruled Bowers
sub silentio"' (quoting Notre Dame Law School professor Doug Kmiec)); id.
("[Laurence] Tribe agrees. Bowers is 'not long for this world."' (quoting Harvard
University School of Law professor Laurence Tribe)).
221. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1344.
222. See id. at 1345.
223. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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minimum constitutes a legitimate interest. Logic dictates that all
compelling interests are at the very least legitimate interests.
2. The classification
Since either morality or associational freedom constitutes a
legitimate state interest, the next element of the test is whether the
classification used to accomplish the state's interest is valid. Un-
der rational basis only an arbitrary or irrational classification of-
fends the Equal Protection Clause. 24 A court makes this determi-
nation by evaluating the scope of the classification in terms of its
inclusiveness or exclusiveness.2s
In Romer the Court makes only a few references to this ele-
ment. The Court stated that Amendment 2 imposed a "broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group."2 By modify-
ing "disability" with the adjectives "broad" and
"undifferentiated," the Court seems to suggest that Amendment 2
is overinclusive. A dialogue during oral argument between the
Court and the defendants' attorney exemplifies the Court's con-
cern for the amendment's potential overinclusiveness.2 7 The
Court asked whether the amendment classified on the basis of ho-
mosexual conduct or mere proclivity.m The attorney answered
that it was not entirely clear but that conduct was perhaps the best
indicator of the group being classified.29 The Court's very next
question was whether conduct was the sole indication of homo-
sexuality.2
0
This colloquy demonstrates the Court's uneasiness with the
potential overinclusiveness of the amendment. The Court might
have been concerned that Amendment 2 would burden persons of
homosexual disposition as well as those engaging in homosexual
conduct. This was important to the Court because if Amendment
2 affected individuals who never engage in homosexual acts, then
it would be more difficult for the state to assert successfully that
224. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (stating that the Court will not
overturn an enactment unless the legislature's actions were irrational); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (finding that a wholly arbitrary act
cannot stand consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment).
225. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
226. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
227. See Oral Argument, supra note 160, at *8-*10.
228. See id. at *8-*9.
229. See id. at *9-*10.
230. See id. at *10.
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associational freedom or morality was the basis of the amendment.
In essence, individuals of homosexual disposition would not dam-
age the state's interests as greatly as those who engage in homo-
sexual acts.3' The Court probably concluded that the classification
was overinclusive. This explanation most likely accounts for the
Court's other reference to the classification as "at once too narrow
and too broad.",232 Although the majority did not explain how this
might be true, the dissent addressed the point and thoroughly re-
jected it.23
In his dissent Justice Scalia referred to the plaintiffs' argument
that there is a distinction between those who engage in homosex-
ual acts and those who are merely of homosexual orientation.Y3
This, the dissent held, was a "distinction without a difference," and
cited to the state supreme court as endorsing this view."5 The
Colorado Supreme Court stated that Amendment 2 targeted a
class on the basis of four characteristics-sexual orientation, con-
duct, practices, and relationships-but that these characteristics
were "nothing more than a different way of identifying the same
class of persons."'"' , The Romer dissent also cited a Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals caseZ 7 which stated that it was "'virtually impos-
sible to distinguish or separate individuals of a particular orienta-
tion which predisposes them toward a particular sexual conduct
from those who actually engage in that particular type of sexual
conduct."' , '
Yet, assuming that there is a distinction between persons en-
gaging in homosexual acts and persons merely of homosexual ori-
entation, Amendment 2 could still be found to be nonarbitrary. A
231. The state does not have a legitimate interest in regulating thoughts or con-
victions. However, the state may restrict certain conduct. This is analogous to situa-
tions arising under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in which the
state may regulate certain religious conduct but not religious beliefs. See, e.g., Em-
ployment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding
the denial of state unemployment benefits for persons convicted of consuming a con-
trolled substance during a religious ritual).
232. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
233. See id. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1350.
237. Equality Found., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995)
(upholding a city charter identical to Amendment 2, which prohibited the city from
providing preferential treatment on the basis of homosexuality).
238. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Equality Found., 54
F.3d at 267).
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basic tenet of equal protection law is that a law's classification
does not fail "merely because it is not made with mathematical ni-
cety or because in practice it results in some inequality."239 Per-
haps the true discomfort the majority felt about Amendment 2's
classification is that it too perfectly targeted a specific group.
Admitting this, however, would mean that the classification is not
overinclusive and that there is no constitutional objection regard-
ing Amendment 2's scope. In short, despite the majority's remon-
stration against the unprecedented nature of the amendment,
240
Amendment 2's classification of homosexuals is constitutionally
permissible under rational basis.
3. The rational relationship between the classification and the
legitimate state interest
Lastly, to uphold an enactment against an equal protection
challenge the legitimate state interest must bear a rational relation
to the classification used to advance that interest.24 ' This is per-
haps the easiest element to satisfy. Generally an enactment sur-
vives challenge if any reason, real or imagined, supports the classi-
fication.4 2 A rational legislator could have reasonably expected
Amendment 2 to prevent the deterioration of the moral fabric of
society by denying homosexuals special protection that would oth-
erwise amount to an implicit acceptance of homosexuality. The
Court could have also accepted the state's argument at the district
court hearing on the merits that Amendment 2 was necessary to
prevent the "homosexual agenda" 243 from overrunning the political
functions of the state and gaining protected status for homosexu-
239. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911).
240. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
241. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,320 (1993).
242. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)
(withstanding an equal protection challenge minimally requires "any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification");
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (hypothesizing a reason
to support a legislature's classification).
243. See Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 756 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. 1993). The district court rejected this reason as being opinion testimony without
sufficient foundation in fact. See id. at 757. However, under rational basis the state
has "no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory clas-
sification." Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. In addition, "[t]he State is not compelled to ver-
ify logical assumptions with statistical evidence." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 812 (1976). Thus, the state's concern over the homosexual agenda
would be rationally related to the classification under Amendment 2.
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als.24
B. The Significance of Amendment 2's Sufficiency Under Rational
Basis
In light of the apparent rational relation between the state's
legitimate interest in morality and the permissible classification of
homosexuals by Amendment 2, it becomes convincingly clear that
Amendment 2 should have survived traditional rational basis re-
view. The Court's contrary conclusion is not significant in and of
itself; rather, it merely indicates a need for alternate explanations
for the Court's conclusion. The most obvious of these is that the
majority did not use rational basis review as claimed. Thus, the
Court has left a fatal inconsistency or void in its legal analysis that
must be explained. The remaining challenge is to evaluate the
possible explanations for the Court's holding in Romer.
VI. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
The Court created a legal void by failing to articulate its rea-
soning clearly. While there may be many possible explanations for
the opinion, the per se theory, the rational basis with teeth theory,
and the sliding scale theory find enough support in the Court's
opinion to represent probable explanations" The remainder of
this Note presents these alternative theories, assesses the suffi-
ciency of each in accounting for the Court's holding, and then
comments on the desirability of each as a possible framework for
equal protection review.
A. The Per Se Explanation
1. Laurence H. Tribe's theory
An amicus curiae brief submitted by Laurence H. Tribe, John
Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and Kathleen M.
Sullivan urged the Court to affirm the state judgment on a per se
theory violation of the Equal Protection Clause. ' 4 The brief ar-
244. See Evans, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
245. Another explanation for Romer's result is the "Rule of Five" Theory. See
Taylor, Judicial Restraint, supra note 12, at S27. This cynical theory holds that the
law is whatever five Justices agree on, and that the individual Justices are governed
by their own political will. See id. This theory is more a comment than an alterna-
tive approach, and as such, is not a viable explanation for Romer.
246. See Amicus Brief for Respondents at 1, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
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gued that Amendment 2 was a rare example of a per se violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, which did not trigger the tradi-
tional bases of equal protection analysis-rational basis, strict
scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny.27 Instead, Amendment 2 in-
volved a "prior and more basic question" not hinging on the na-
ture of the rights implicated nor the class it targeted.248 This "more
basic question" was whether a state could "set some persons apart
by declaring that a personal characteristic that they share may not
be made the basis for any protection pursuant to the state's laws
from any instance of discrimination." '  The postulated answer
was in the negative.2 5 The brief argued that Amendment 2's
"facial unconstitutionality flows directly from the plain meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment's text. For Amendment 2 renders a
'class of persons' in Colorado completely ineligible for the protec-
tion of its laws from an entire category of mistreatment."'M
The brief advanced another argument: Amendment 2 worked
a complete denial of protection because Colorado "used its consti-
tution affirmatively to disable all lawmaking and law-enforcing
processes within its borders."252 Amendment 2 put homosexuals
beyond the reach of the state's system for making and enforcing
laws.253 Thus, the brief hypothesized:
[I]f a law, policy, or common-law rule forbidding, for ex-
ample, arbitrary job dismissal... were to be enforced by a
branch, department, agency, court or subdivision of the
state in a manner that treated homosexuality as an
'arbitrary' basis for dismissal ... that enforcement deci-
sion would.., be barred by Amendment 2.2
This is because the amendment prohibited homosexual orienta-
tion, conduct, or relationships from forming the basis of any claim
of discrimination. The brief argued that even if the Colorado Su-
preme Court authoritatively construed Amendment 2 as limited to
statutes, ordinances, and regulations, thereby excluding policy or
common law protection, the amendment would still violate the
(1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
247. See id. at 3.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 6.
253. See id. at 7.
254. Id. at 7 n.3.
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Equal Protection Clause because "some persons would have access
only to common-law-based legal protections from discrimination,
and never to any anti-discrimination protections under the state's
positive laws."' 5
Finally, the brief pointed out the unprecedented nature of
Amendment 2 and argued that the Amendment was currently and
historically incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause.2 The
brief noted that "[b]etween the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the enactment of Amendment 2, [the Supreme
Court had] never been presented with a decision by any state ex-
plicitly to deny selected persons access to the protection of its laws
from a whole category of wrongful conduct." In short, Amend-
ment 2 was "literally unprecedented."'258
2. The per se theory's influence on the Court
That the Court was influenced by Tribe's per se theory can be
shown from the many ideas incorporated into the final opinion.
Just as the amicus brief articulated Amendment 2's complete de-
nial of protection at any level of state or local government, 29 the
Court similarly found that Amendment 2 prohibited "all legisla-
tive, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local gov-
ernment designed to protect the named class"26 and that the
amendment withdrew protection from no others but homosexu-
als.26' In discussing the reach of Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy
hypothesized that an official in charge of general laws prohibiting
arbitrary discrimination who found that homosexuality was an ar-
bitrary basis of discrimination would be violating the amendment's
prohibition on homosexuality as being the basis of any decision.6 2
In substance, this hypothetical was the same one used by Tribe to
255. Id.
256. See id. at 13.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 6. Tribe, in discussing the amendment, stated that the
denial of protection is complete, for Colorado has used its constitution af-
firmatively to disable all lawmaking and law-enforcing processes within its
borders-whether involving state legislation, a local ordinance, or the
adoption or enforcement of a "policy" by state executives, administrators,
or judges-that might otherwise provide legal protection from discrimina-
tion.
Id.
260. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (emphasis added).
261. See id. at 1625.
262. See id. at 1626.
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illustrate the amendment's prohibition on homosexuality as the
basis of any enforcement decision.6 The Court also echoed the
briefs declaration that Amendment 2 was an "unprecedented"
enactment in our jurisprudence, and went even further in holding
that the absence of precedent was "instructive." 264 Finally, the re-
peated references to common law protection found as illustrations
in the amicus brief may have significantly influenced Part II of the
Court's opinion dealing with the radical change in common law
protection for homosexuals. 65
3. The desirability of a per se standard
While Tribe contends the Court relied on the per se theory
when. it found that Amendment 2 confounded the normal process
266
of judicial review, there is no explicit reference in the opinion to
a per se standard of equal protection review. The Court was
arguably influenced by the theory but refused to formally adopt it.
The Court rightfully refrained from formally recognizing such a
theory for a number of reasons.
First, if the Court accepted Tribe's per se theory, it would
have complicated the equal protection standards of review. It
would be the most severe form of judicial review since its applica-
tion results in automatic invalidation. At the same time, the per se
standard would be the most easily applied standard because it in-
volves a "more basic question" of whether there has been a viola-
tion of the literal meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.267 On
an intuitive level this theory has some allure, for it seems reason-
able to find a literal violation of the Equal Protection Clause when
an enactment's classification results in grossly unequal treatment
of a certain group of people. But apart from its theoretical allure,
there is great difficulty in the theory's practical application.
The difficulty in deciding when this standard is triggered may
have been the Court's second reason for avoiding a per se test.
The factors that trigger this standard of review are not clear. Pos-
sible factors include a lack of precedent, as argued by Tribe,268 or a
263. See supra text accompanying note 254.
264. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
265. See Amicus Brief, supra note 246, at 4-7 & n.3 (referring to common law rob-
bery, blackmail, and antidiscrimination laws).
266. See Reuben, supra note 13, at 30.
267. See Amicus Brief, supra note 246, at 3.
268. See id at 13.
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single group's complete disqualification of protection from an en-
tire category of mistreatment as argued by the brief.269 However,
aside from these possible factors, the triggering mechanism for the
per se theory would be an arbitrary one fraught with difficulties.
Lastly, the Court's failure to accept this theory may have been
tied to the theory's inherent harshness. If an enactment qualifies
for per se review, there will be no review at all because it will be
found irrefutably unconstitutional. In short, while the Court un-
deniably drew some of its analysis from the amicus brief filed by
the constitutional law scholars, the per se theory they advanced
does not sufficiently explain the holding in Romer. It also does not
provide a satisfactory framework for equal protection review.
B. The Rational Basis with Teeth Explanation
The discussion of the per se theory's influence on the Court
demonstrates that there was more at work than a traditional ra-
tional basis review of Amendment 2. The language of the opinion
was that of rational basis, but the substance was not. In recent
years commentators have identified a hybrid form of rational basis
whereby the Court, "under the guise of 'mere rationality,"' actu-
ally applies a heightened and more demanding level of review.2"
This type of review, while not acknowledged by the Court itself,
has been called "rational basis with teeth."1
1. The rational basis with teeth model
The 1985 Supreme Court case City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.272 best illustrates this model of review. In City
of Cleburne a group home for the mentally disabled used the
Equal Protection Clause to challenge a city zoning ordinance re-
quiring special permits for such homes.273 The city denied the issu-
ance of plaintiffs' special permit even though the zoning ordinance
allowed apartment houses, multiple dwellings, dormitories, and
even hospitals to be built274 The court of appeals found that men-
269. See id. at 5.
270. Pond, supra note 135, at 195 (citation omitted).
271. See, e.g., David 0. Stewart, Supreme Court Report: A Growing Equal Pro-
tection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985 at 108, 112; Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational
Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 794
(1987).
272. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
273. See id. at 435.
274. See id. at 436-37 & n.3.
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tally disabled persons constituted a quasi-suspect class and applied
intermediate review.2s The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's judgment7 6 but rejected the finding that mentally disabled
persons should be considered a quasi-suspect class. 2 Instead, the
Court deemed rational basis the proper equal protection standard
of review. 28
One of the reasons offered to justify the rejection of a quasi-
suspect classification for the mentally disabled was public policy:
"if the large and amorphous class of the mentally [disabled] were
deemed quasi-suspect.., it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who ... can claim
some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large."279 The Court may have been concerned with homosexuals
or other groups who might analogize themselves to the mentally
disabled, in terms of discrimination, in order to gain quasi-suspect
status, and accordingly, a heightened level of review.2
The City of Clebume Court analyzed the ordinance under ra-
tional basis, but found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to
the mentally disabled because no rational justification for the de-
nial of a special permit to this group could be found.8' While ra-
tional basis requires nothing more than a rational relation to some
legitimate state purpose, the Court found each proffered state in-
terest insufficient because the interests did not actually further the
state's alleged purpose2m Many commentators saw the Court's
review as more exacting than required under traditional rational
basis.2 It seems the Court was motivated to reach this conclusion
because of the perceived prejudice against the mentally disabled.U
However, the Court was equally compelled to avoid the unfore-
seen ramifications that would flow from labeling the mentally dis-
275. See id. at 437-38.
276. See id. at 450.
277. See id. at 446.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 445.
280. Homosexual groups could make the following argument: Mental disability is
a manifestation of a genetic difference. In City of Cleburne a genetic difference was
the basis for extra judicial protection against discrimination. Therefore, since science
seems to indicate that homosexuality is the manifestation of a genetic difference,
homosexuals should also receive heightened protection against discrimination.
281. See id. at 448.
282. See id. at 448-50.
283. See Pond, supra note 135, at 196; Pettinga, supra note 271, at 794.
284. See Pond, supra note 135, at 196.
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abled a quasi-suspect class.
2. Is Romer another instance of rational basis with teeth?
The rational basis with teeth model illustrated by City of Cle-
burne is a situation in which the court does not formally adopt a
higher standard of review but reaches a result consistent with a
higher standard of review. The Court's decision in Romer might
represent another instance of rational basis with teeth review for
two reasons. First, the Court refused to review Amendment 2 un-
der strict scrutiny as the state courts did. Second, the Court
reached the result it would have under strict scrutiny although it
purported to apply the less stringent rational basis standard.
The Romer Court refused to adopt the reasoning of the Colo-
rado courts.m Both the district court and the Colorado Supreme
Court held that Amendment 2 required a strict scrutiny analysis
because it infringed upon a fundamental right. 6 The district court
held that Amendment 2 violated the fundamental right not to have
the State endorse and give effect to private biases.' However, this
fundamental right was broader than the Colorado Supreme Court
was willing to accept. Thus, the state supreme court identified a
different fundamental right by extrapolating ideas from four lines
of United States Supreme Court cases dealing with precondi-
tions, s reapportionment,289 candidate eligibility,20 and obstruc-
285. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620,1624 (1996).
286. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993).
287. See Evans v. Romer, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,998, at 73,841 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. 1993).
288. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1277 (finding that the United States Supreme Court
has "consistently struck down legislation which establishes preconditions on the ex-
ercise of the franchise"); see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 630-33 (1969) (holding unconstitutional the requirement that voters have prop-
erty or children before they can exercise the right to vote in school district elections);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966) (holding unconstitu-
tional a requirement that voters pay a poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94
(1965) ("fencing out" a certain class of voters).
289. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278 (finding that the value of equal participation
emerges from reapportionment cases and that "equal protection requires that voters
are able to exercise the right of franchise on an even footing with others"); see, e.g.,
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693 (1989) ("'[E]ach and every citizen has
an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes."'
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964))); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
379-80 (1963) ("The concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no
preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifica-
tions.").
290. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1278 (finding that the right to political participation
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and obstructions in the normal political processes.2 ' Combining
these lines of cases, the court found that Amendment 2 infringed
on the fundamental right of homosexuals to "participate equally in
the political process [because the amendment] 'fenc[ed] out' an in-
dependently identifiable class of persons. ' '2 2 But just as in City of
Cleburne, the Romer majority did not accept either of the broad
fundamental right formulations of the Colorado courts. 293 The
Court tersely stated that it would "affirm the judgment, but on a
rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme
Court.
, ,29 4
One of the reasons for rejecting the Colorado Supreme
Court's strict scrutiny analysis might have been the need to avoid
the unforeseen ramifications that the new fundamental right of
equal political participation might have.295 The consequences of a
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process
may have been too profound and far-reaching. At the same time it
seems that Justice Kennedy was not willing to declare sexual ori-
entation a suspect category. Having rejected any fundamental
right or suspect classification, the majority was not formally able to
subject Amendment 2 to rigorous and exacting judicial review
under strict scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the dissent accused the majority of implicitly
has been consistently relied on to strike down legislation in candidate eligibility
cases); see, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979) (invalidating Illinois statutes that discriminated against minority parties even
though the state might have a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candi-
dates that appeared on the ballot); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
(invalidating Ohio statutes that made it nearly impossible for new political parties
with widespread support, or old parties with little support, to be placed on the state
ballot).
291. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282 (finding that the United States Supreme Court's
invalidation of a "broad spectrum of discriminatory legislation" was not limited to
those based on race); see, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457
(1982) (invalidating a school district's mandatory busing scheme as a way of achiev-
ing desegregation); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding a statute requir-
ing the approval of 60% of the voters for bond indebtedness or tax rate increases);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating a city charter placing special
burdens on minorities within the governmental process).
292. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
293. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Decisions Expand Equal Protection Rights, NAT'L
L.J., July 29, 1996, at C7.
294. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
295. See Frum, supra note 11, at 11 ("What Justice Kennedy wanted to do in
Romer v. Evans was void Proposition 2 without declaring sexual orientation a
'suspect category' under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a declaration would
have ignited a political firestorm .... ).
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adopting the equal political participation theory it purported to
reject." Justice Scalia, in his dissent stated, "[t]he central thesis of
the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal protection
when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid disadvan-
tage), it must have recourse to a more general and hence more
difficult level of political decisionmaking than others."2 7 The dis-
sent stated that no multilevel democracy could function under such
a standard, "[flor whenever a disadvantage is imposed, or conferral
of a benefit is prohibited, at one of the higher levels of democratic
decisionmaking... the affected group has (under this theory) been
denied equal protection." ' The dissent illustrated its criticism
with an example: to curb the effects of despotism, a state passes a
law prohibiting the award of municipal contracts to the relatives of
mayors or city council persons.29 The group composed of relatives
now must appeal to the state legislature in order to get the benefit
of city contracts, while all other citizens only need to persuade the
municipality.3°° For the dissent, it is "ridiculous to consider this a
denial of equal protection""3 ' because nearly all laws require cer-
tain groups to appeal to a higher decision-making level.
The foregoing discussion strongly suggests that the Romer
majority utilized rational basis with teeth. At the very least, this
explains how Amendment 2 was held unconstitutional without
considering homosexuals a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
3. The desirability of the rational basis with teeth review
While this theory is a plausible explanation for the Court's
decision, the desirability of this type of heightened review is still in
question. Romer raises some critical constitutional concerns,
which merit discussion.
The first concern with the rational basis with teeth analysis is
its disingenuousness. 3 2 The Court holds out the semblance of
mere rational basis review but actually applies a form of height-
ened review. By doing so, the Court undermines its own credibil-
ity. In addition, the Romer majority stated that equal protection
296. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1630-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. See id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
300. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
302. See Frum, supra note 11, at 12 ("In the end, Romer v. Evans is a bad judg-
ment because it is a dishonest one.").
[Vol. 30:1277
CHANGING EQUAL PROTECTION
standards provide "guidance and discipline for the legislature"
with respect to what sorts of laws it can enact.3  Yet, the use of
rational basis with teeth subverts this goal and makes it more diffi-
cult for the legislature to know the limits of its power. The legisla-
ture is left bewildered as to whether a certain enactment actually
failed rational review or if the Court found something intuitively
unfair about the legislature's classification. Moreover, inasmuch
as the equal protection standards lend guidance to the legislature,
they equally restrain the judiciary from overstepping its limits. It
is often asserted that the Court does not sit as a superlegislature
and judge the wisdom of legislative enactments3 4 It seems that
rational basis with teeth undermines this principle.
The second concern regarding rational basis with teeth is that
it is not clear which enactments will be subject to this higher level
of review. It might be argued that when the Court characterized
Amendment 2 as imposing a "broad and undifferentiated disability
on a single named group," it was actually formulating a test that
would trigger rational basis with teeth review."*' This reading of
Romer would be consistent with City of Cleburne because there
the ordinance placed a broad burden only on the mentally dis-
abled.
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this standard will
yield principled and consistent decisions. For instance, will the
Court apply rational basis with teeth when a law places a broad
and undifferentiated burden on any "single named group" or only
certain groups the Court feels are in need of protection? Argua-
bly, the Court is very conscious of which groups it chooses for this
standard of review and that thus far it has decided to protect the
mentally disabled and homosexuals. One wonders what result the
Court would reach if an enactment placed a broad disability on
smokers. Would the Court be as willing to subject that law to
harsher review?
Rational basis with teeth may hamper legislatures in their at-
tempts to discern the demarcation line between permissible and
impermissible enactments, and may result in unprincipled applica-
tion. Additionally, it may blur the limits of the judiciary's own
power and allow for unconstitutional interference with a coordi-
nate branch. Thus, there are substantial reasons for the Court to
303. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
304. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303 (1976) (per curiam).
305. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
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move slowly and carefully in this arena as well as a need for the
Court to enunciate and explain its actions.
C. The Sliding-Scale Explanation
1. The sliding-scale model
The sufficiency of the three-tiered equal protection standard
of review has been questioned by not only legal commentators but
by individual justices of the Supreme Court.3 6 However, it was
Justice Thurgood Marshall who, in addition to voicing his dissatis-
faction with the existing equal protection framework, actually sug-
gested a complete break with the traditional standards of equal
protection review.
3°
3
Justice. Marshall's dissent in Dandridge v. Williams.. sug-
gested a balancing test that would take into consideration the
"facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the
state claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification. ' '3 9 Through a progeny of dis-
310sents, Justice Marshall articulated three prongs to this balancing
test: (1) the "'importance of the governmental benefits denied
' ''3 1
(2) the "'character of the class'"32 and (3) the "'asserted state in-
terests.' 313  Legal scholars have come to call Justice Marshall's
three-prong balancing approach the "multifactor, sliding-scale"
306. Justice Stevens stated, "I am inclined to believe that what has become known
as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely
logical method of deciding cases." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,212 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Powell found that there existed "valid reasons for
dissatisfaction with the 'two-tiered' approach." Id. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Court refers to a two-tiered standard because in 1976 the Court had not for-
mally accepted intermediate scrutiny as a separate level of review.
307. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
308. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
309. Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
310. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 337-48 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454-62 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall's
dissent applies to the companion case of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
311. Beal, 432 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
312. Id. (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
313. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
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314
method of equal protection review.
The sliding-scale method differs conceptually from the current
three-tier standard of review. The three-tier method attempts to
pigeonhole rights as either fundamental or nonfundamental. 315
This rigid system does not take into account the relative impor-
tance of the rights of those affected but only determines whether
or not a right is fundamental.
A sliding-scale approach does not cast rights as either/or
propositions, fundamental or nonfundamental. Instead, a sliding-
scale approach weighs the right according to its relative impor-
tance.31 Fundamental rights are still recognized but in addition so
are other non-fundamental rights. All nonfundamental rights are
not automatically accorded the lowest standard of review. Instead,
vital, crucial, substantial, or moderate rights are all given some
varying form of heightened scrutiny depending on the relative im-
portance of the right.
The term "multifactor" indicates that after a court determines
the relative importance of the right, it will balance many factors in
deciding whether a certain enactment actually infringes on that
right, thereby violating the equal protection guarantee. Under the
traditional equal protection framework, if a statute regulated a
social or economic activity it would automatically receive rational
basis review and would be accorded great deference. 317 The same
is not true under a balancing test, which balances the importance
of the government benefits denied to the class of persons affected
by the economic enactment against the state's interest embodied in
that economic enactment.318
Justice Marshall's dissent in Maher v. Roe3 9 best illustrates
this multifactor, sliding-scale approach. In Maher indigent females
of racial minorities claimed that the state violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by funding only medically necessary abortions.32
The majority found that the statutes at issue merited rational basis
314. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1972).
315. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471,520 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
316. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
317. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303 (1976) (per curiam).
318. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
319. 432 U.S. 464, (1977). Justice Marshall's dissent is actually found in Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438,454-62 (1977) but also applies to the companion case of Maher.
320. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 441-42.
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review because the classifications neither involved a suspect class321
nor implicated a fundamental right.3'2 The majority then rejected
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim and held that the states were
not obligated to fund nontherapeutic abortions under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act.
In his dissent Justice Marshall criticized the Court for its
"insensitivity to the human dimension" in rendering the decision,
and asserted the inadequacy of the three-tiered mode of analysis.
324
He advocated the use of his three-pronged balancing test.311 Under
the first prong, Justice Marshall began by evaluating the impor-
tance of the governmental benefits being denied. He conceded
that the two hundred dollar cost of a first trimester abortion did
not represent a large sum of money but nevertheless found the
governmental funding "of absolutely vital importance in the lives
of the recipients., 326 An absence of state funding would effectively
deny these women the right to have an abortion.
Moving to the second prong, he found that the denial of gov-
ernmental subsidies more heavily impacted the class of indigent
minority women.3z Justice Marshall argued that "[w]hile poverty
alone does not entitle a class to claim government benefits, it is
surely a relevant factor in the present inquiry."32* Statistical evi-
dence indicated that forty percent of minority women-a figure
five times greater for Caucasian women-depended on medical121
aid from the government for their health care. Justice Marshall
believed this was an important consideration.3
Finally, Justice Marshall balanced the first two interests
against the asserted state interest in "protecting the potential life
of the fetus."331 He concluded that even if there were a state inter-
est in the potential life of the fetus, it could not outweigh the
"deprivation or serious discouragement of a vital constitutional
right of especial importance to poor and minority women.
33 2
321. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 470.
322. See id. at 474.
323. See id. at 469-70.
324. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 457 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
325. See id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
326. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
327. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 459 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. See id. at 459-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
330. See id (Marshall, . dissenting).
331. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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It is significant to note how Justice Marshall characterized the
right involved. He did not refer to the right as fundamental or
nonfundamental; rather he spoke of the right as "vital" and of
"especial importance. 33 3 By avoiding the strict scrutiny label, Jus-
tice Marshall was demonstrating his sliding-scale approach.
2. The Romer majority's implicit use of a multifactor, sliding-scale
standard of review
Despite Romer's ambiguity with respect to the standard of
equal protection review, the majority arguably applied an implicit
balancing standard. From the start the Court cited to one of the
basic tenets of the balancing standard by stating that a law's factual
context should be considered in ascertaining a classification's ra-
tional relationship to an independent and legitimate end.334 Justice
Marshall in Dandridge expressly advocated looking to the "facts
and circumstances behind the law."33 In addition to this reference,
the Romer Court's opinion implicitly employed the three prongs of
the balancing test as set forth by Justice Marshall. The Romer
Court looked to the nature of the governmental benefit denied by
Amendment 2, the character of the class from whom the benefits
were withheld, and the asserted state interests for the classifica-
tion.
a. the nature of the governmental benefit denied: basic protection
The prong that received the most discussion and weight was
the nature of the governmental benefit denied by Amendment 2.
The Court initially characterized the effects of Amendment 2 as a
denial of certain protections but then concluded that the denial re-
sulted in the imposition of a disability.336 The "special disability"
placed on homosexuals was the denial of "all legislative, executive
or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed
to protect the named class.3 37 By denying homosexuals the safe-
guards others enjoyed without constraint, 3 s homosexuals as a class
could only obtain specific protection against discrimination by
either convincing the electorate to pass a constitutional amend-
333. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
334. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620,1627 (1996).
335. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
336. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
337. Id. at 1623.
338. See id. at 1627.
ApH1997] 1319
1320 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ment or by attempting to pass laws of general applicability that
would accord them protection without specifically naming them.
339
The Court explained that "[a] law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government" was a denial of equal protection.m4
The Court's concern over the nature of the governmental
benefit denied can also be seen through the questions posed during
oral argument. The Court asked whether there would be recourse
for homosexuals against a public hospital that singled out homo-
sexuals for the denial of dialysis treatment. 1 Receiving no defini-
tive answer, the Court then asked whether a police department
could promulgate a policy deploring gay-bashing and strive for its
prevention; whether a library could enact a policy whereby homo-
sexuals could no longer be prevented from entering the library; or
if the health department or the insurance commissioner could pass
a similar policy protecting homosexuals while still remaining true
to Amendment 2's proscription against using homosexuality as the
basis for any enactment or policy.42 These questions highlight the
Court's concern regarding the nature and the extent of the gov-
ernmental benefits that Amendment 2 would deny homosexuals.
The Court's implicit analysis of the nature of the governmen-
tal benefit denied-or the nature of the governmental disability
imposed-in both its opinion and questions during oral argument,
evinces the special emphasis and weight the Court placed on this
first prong of the balancing test. To the Court, the protections
denied homosexuals were vital and significant as they concerned
health, police protection, public access, and insurance.
b. the character of the class
While references to homosexuals as a class are sparse, there
are enough to find that the Court addressed the second prong of
the balancing test regarding the character of the class. The Court
spoke of Amendment 2 as raismig the "inevitable inference ... of
animosity" toward homosexuals. Although the Court stated this
while identifying the sphere of legitimate state interests,34 the
339. See id.
340. Id. at 1628.
341. See Oral Argument, supra note 160, at *26.
342. See id. at *27.
343. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
344. See id.
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statement is nevertheless logically relevant for the purposes of de-
scribing the character of the class. For the Romer Court, the fact
that the majority of the Colorado electorate approved Amend-
ment 2 5 indicated that homosexuals were strongly disfavored and
that a large segment of society held them in contempt and fostered
animus towards them. Such a view supported the assessment that
homosexuals are a group discriminated against by the majority.
This is why the Court stated "'that a bare... desire to harm a po-
litically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmen-
tal interest."'" Nevertheless, one could legitimately argue that
this prong is weak because while homosexuals lost the vote on
Amendment 2, they amassed forty-six percent of the vote.37 A
group constituting only four percent of the population cannot be
deemed politically unpopular when it rallied an additional forty-
two percent of the voters to its side.
The fact that the Court discussed homosexuals as being politi-
cally unpopular and the object of hate strongly suggests that it
based some of its analysis on the character of the class itself.
While under traditional rational basis review the character of the
class is not considered,39 it is clear that the Court considered
Amendment 2's targeting of homosexuals in its analysis.
c. balancing prongs one and two against the state's interest in the
classification
To counterbalance both the weight of the governmental
benefit denied and the politically unpopular character of homo-
sexuals, the state would have to offer a significant legitimate inter-
est. Protecting the associational freedom of landlords holding re-
ligious convictions contrary to homosexuality was not sufficient in
its own right nor was it sufficient when coupled with the state's
secondary claimed interest in preserving resources to fight other
forms of discrimination.30 The Court undoubtedly perceived the
morality-based foundation for these proffered reasons because the
345. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (stating that Amend-
ment 2 passed by a margin of 53.4% to 46.6%).
346. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added) (quoting United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973)).
347. See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
348. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
349. Only the scope of the classification is evaluated, not the nature of the class
itself. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
350. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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state had explicitly advanced morality as a legitimate state inter-
est.351 The Court also knew that under Bowers v. Hardwick,2 mo-
rality is a legitimate state interest sufficient to support rational ba-
sis.35 Therefore, the Court must have concluded that while these
proffered state interests based on majoritarian moral belief were
legitimate, they were insufficient when balanced against the severe
governmental benefit denied to the class of homosexuals who con-
stituted a politically unpopular group. Stated another way, while
morality is still a legitimate state interest, it carries very little
weight in the balancing method of analysis.3 4 This reading pro-
vides a plausible explanation resolving the apparent inconsistency
between Romer and Bowers.
The Court's opinion supports this conclusion because the
Court did not reject these state interests as illegitimate, but rather
found that the "breadth of the Amendment [was] so far removed
from these particular justifications that... [they were] impossible
to credit. 35 This is merely another way of saying that the negative
effects of Amendment 2 significantly outweighed the state inter-
ests offered for it.
3. The balancing, sliding-scale approach is consistent
with other recent cases
Recent cases from both the Supreme Court and the lower fed-
eral courts evince a trend toward balancing and sliding-scale ap-
proaches. These courts have explicitly made reference to balanc-
ing. For example, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health355 the Court was squarely presented with the issue of
whether the Constitution granted the right to die. In resolving this
351. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 (Colo. 1994).
352. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
353. See id. at 196; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.
354. See Francis Mancini, Dangerous Ruling on Gay Rights, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., May 23, 1996, at B7 ("[I]t seems that, as far as Justice Kennedy is concerned,
traditional moral strictures against homosexuality... should be discounted as consti-
tutionally legitimate bases for public policy.").
355. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
356. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan the parents and coguardians sought a court
order directing the termination of artificial life-saving equipment for their daughter,
Nancy Cruzan, who was relegated to a persistent vegetative state as a result of an
automobile accident. See id at 265-66. The state supreme court held that Cruzan's
parents lacked the authority to withdraw the life-saving treatment because there was
no clear and convincing evidence of Cruzan's desire to have such treatment termi-
nated under such circumstances. See icl. at 265.
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issue, the Court stated that to determine whether a constitutional
right had been violated under the Due Process Clause, it would
"'balanc[e] . . .liberty interests against the relevant state inter-
ests."' 3 The Cruzan Court's holding is significant because of the
application of this balancing test.
Similarly, in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth
Circuit, dealing with the same issue, applied a balancing test and
found that Washington's statute prohibiting physicians from pre-
scribing life-ending medication for use by the terminally ill vio-
lated the Due Process Clause.5 9 Particularly significant was the
observation the court made that,
[r]ecent cases, including Cruzan, suggest that the Court
may be heading towards the formal adoption of the con-
tinuum approach, along with a balancing test, in substan-
tive due process cases generally. If so, there would no
longer be a two-tier or three-tier set of tests that depends
on the classification of the right or interest as fundamen-
tal, important, or marginal. Instead, the more important
the individual's right or interest, the more persuasive the
justifications for infringement would have to be.
36°
So there seems to be merit in suggesting that the Court's most re-
cent cases, including Romer, evince a judicial willingness to em-
ploy a balancing test instead of a rigid three-tiered analysis in both
due process and equal protection cases.
At the same time, the federal courts appear to be moving to-
ward a sliding-scale approach and seem reluctant to adhere to a
rigid analytical framework under equal protection review. Even
the Supreme Court is becoming increasingly willing to blur the
boundaries between the different tiers. For instance, in a joint
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,36 Justices O'Connor,
357. Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
358. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 2553 (U.S.
Oct. 8, 1996) (No. 96-110). In Compassion plaintiff-doctors and plaintiff-patients
brought suit to compel the state to allow terminally ill, competent adult patients to
die with peace and dignity through the assistance of physician-administered, life-
ending medication. See id. at 794.
359. Id. at 793-94.
360. Id. at 804.
361. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Abortion clinics and physicians challenged Pennsylva-
nia abortion statutes, which required: (1) that a woman give her informed consent
prior to an abortion; (2) that she be provided with information regarding abortions
twenty-four hours in advance of an abortion; and (3) that, if married, she notify her
husband of her decision to have an abortion. See id. at 844. In the case of a minor,
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Kennedy, and Souter expressed their dissatisfaction with the rigid-
ity of the strict scrutiny standard, and in its place adopted the rela-
tivistic undue burden standard.32 They rejected the strict scrutiny
standard as unreceptive to the existence of important state inter-
ests.3
Most recently, the Court blurred the parameters of the inter-
mediate standard of equal protection review in United States v.
Virginia.364 There the Court reformulated the intermediate scru-
tiny test, which traditionally required a "sufficiently important
governmental interest," to whether there existed an "exceedingly
persuasive justification."
36 1
When these changes are considered in conjunction with the
emergence of a rational basis with teeth standard, the Court may
be signalling its discomfort with the three-tiered standard of re-
view and its desire to move toward the sliding-scale method of
analysis.
4. The propriety of balancing and sliding-scale systems
There are certain advantages to a multifactor, sliding-scale
approach-among them is the avoidance of shallow, formalistic
analysis. Under the traditional equal protection framework, the
Court is able to sidestep genuine and thoughtful legal analysis by
merely invoking a label, "with the implication that from there the
answer is obvious. 3 66 With a sliding-scale analysis the Court's true
basis for its decision is more likely to surface because judges will
not be forced to explain their reasoning within the rigid three-
tiered model.36
the statutes required that she inform at least one parent. See id. In analyzing these
statutes Justice O'Connor employed a new test called the "undue burden test" in-
stead of the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 876-78. An "undue burden" exists if the state
places a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman seeking an elective abortion. See
id. at 878.
362. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 878.
363. See id. at 871.
364. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The Supreme Court upheld a challenge by the United
States against the State of Virginia and the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) alleging
that VMI's exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 2276-82.
365. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. at 2276.
366. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
characterizing social security as purely the regulation of business for the purposes of
granting highly deferential review).
367. See Iijima, supra note 76, at 380.
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However, there are some inherent disadvantages to the adop-
tion of a multifactor, sliding-scale analysis. The most serious con-
cern is that it will lead to an increased potential for unbridled ju-
dicial interference with the legislative branch.3 The Court has
often stated that it is neither the Court's position to judge the wis-
dom of the legislature nor to act as. a superlegislature but only to
invalidate enactments that violate the Constitution.369 Former
Chief Justice Warren Burger articulated the dangers of failing to
exercise self-restraint, stating that "unwarranted judicial action...
tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes.
370
Not so long ago, the Court, by overstepping judicial restraint,
brought about the evil known as Lochnerism. Although the ju-
diciary is the final arbiter of disputes under the Constitution, it
should be cautious of disrupting the checks and balances it is en-
trusted to uphold.
VII. SYNTHESIS OF THE HOLDING
A. The Analytical Underpinnings of Romer
The alternative theories expounded in Part VI attempt to rec-
oncile the Court's holding in Romer with current notions of equal
protection review. These alternative theories, however, presup-
pose that the Romer Court was not attempting to create an en-
tirely new doctrine of equal protection review. Yet there remains
the possibility that the Romer Court intended to formulate an en-
tirely new doctrine of equal protection review. If so, the Court's
ruling seems to be based on two fundamental, policy-based con-
cepts.
The first concept is that courts should conduct more substan-
tive, in-depth analyses and avoid superficial forms of review.
Labels must not be used by courts in lieu of actual legal analysis. 2
The multifactor, sliding-scale approach perhaps best personifies
368. Seeid.at381.
369. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303 (1976) (per curiam).
370. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,253 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
371. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword." The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43,63-64 (1989).
372. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing the majority for labeling something as being "in 'the area of eco-
nomics and social welfare,' with the implication that from there the answer [was]
obvious").
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this concept because it renounces labels entirely and instead sys-
tematically balances the actual interests of all the parties involved
in the conflict.373 A rational basis with teeth standard is also in-
dicative of this first concept because, under this approach the
Court looks to see if the classification actually furthers the prof-
fered state interests.37 4 The Court's review under rational basis
with teeth is not based on some abstract notion of rationality but
rather grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case."'
The second concept is the notion of fairness. This is the belief
that the Equal Protection Clause is, in essence, a doctrine of fair-
ness: that there is something inherently unjust in treating indi-
viduals differently when no justifiable reasons exist for doing so.
The per se theory falls within this second concept by finding a lit-
eral violation of the Equal Protection Clause-or a violation of
fairness principles-when a single group is denied protection from
discrimination.
B. Romer: A New Doctrine?
If the Court formulated a new doctrine, it was unable to craft
a single rule that incorporated the dual concepts enunciated above.
Instead, it discussed a set of factors that would have the effect of
encouraging greater substantive review and fairness in judicial de-
terminations under the Equal Protection Clause. Six factors may
be deduced from the Court's discussion of Amendment 2 as rele-
vant: (1) the importance of the state interest; (2) the scope of the
classification; (3) the nature of those individuals affected; (4) the
effect of the classification; (5) the underlying purpose of the classi-
fication; and (6) the ability of the burdened group to seek the assis-
tance of the government. While it is not certain how much weight
each factor deserves, it is clear that no one factor is dispositive.
The first factor is the importance of the state interest.376 The
Court's holding in Romer may stand for the proposition that socie-
tal interests in maintaining majoritarian morality do not constitute
significant or important interests.3 n At the same time, the Court
may be less willing to quash equal protection challenges when the
373. See discussion supra Part VI.C.
374. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
375. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
see also discussion supra Part VI.B.
376. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
377. See discussion supra Part VI.C.2.c.
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state's interests are based on religious objections or fiscal inter-
ests.378
The second factor concerns the scope of the classification.3 9
Classifications that narrowly target a particular group are prob-
lematic. In Romer the amendment specifically targeted homo-
sexuals-it "identifi[ed] persons by a single trait."38 This "singling
out [of] a certain class" was one of the reasons the Court found the
amendment unconstitutional.381 The logical corollary to this factor
is that classifications are less problematic when they classify per-
sons generally or less specifically.
The third factor deals with the nature of the classified group.
When an enactment classifies a politically unpopular group, the
Court is more likely to find a violation of the equal protection
guarantee.3 3 To the Romer Court, homosexuals constituted an
unpopular group.3 4 However, if the amendment in Colorado had
targeted smokers, the Court would have been less concerned
because smokers do not constitute a politically unpopular group.
Additionally, if the classified group is perceived to pose a social
harm, then the Court is less likely to find the classification uncon-
stitutional. For example, the Court has upheld laws that deny po-
lygamists the right to vote.3" Evidently, for the Court, homosexu-
als do not pose the same social harm as polygamists.37
The fourth factor is the practical effect of the classification3
When an enactment denies basic protections such as police pro-
tection, hospital treatment, and access to public facilities, the
Court is likely to find that the classification is unconstitutional. In
Romer the Court stated that Amendment 2 prohibited the state or
any subdivision from adopting laws to protect homosexuals.388
Homosexuals were deprived of the protection of the general laws
378. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
379. See id. at 1627-28.
380. Id. at 1628.
381. Id.
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890)).
386. See id. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Has the Court concluded that the per-
ceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the per-
ceived social harm of homosexuality is not?").
387. See id. at 1626.
388. See id. at 1625.
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and policies that prohibited arbitrary discrimination."' Following
the logic of this fourth factor, if a classification only denies some
general form of economic advantage or denies some nonessential
protection, then it will probably not be problematic.
The fifth factor concerns the underlying purpose or motive for
the classification.' If the Court determines that the purpose of a
certain classification is to disadvantage the burdened class or arises
out of animosity towards that class, then the enactment will be
questioned.39" ' But if the state can show some independent reasons
for the classification resulting in incidental disadvantage to those
classified, then the enactment would be unassailable.3 9 The Court
has stated that "[e]ven laws enacted for broad and ambitious pur-
poses often can be explained by reference to legitimate public
policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on
certain persons."
393
The final factor concerns the ability of those burdened by the
classification to seek the assistance of the government.3 4. The
Court has stated, as a general principle, that laws which make it
more difficult for one group to seek the assistance of the govern-
ment are a literal violation of the Equal Protection Clause.3 5 A
law may make it more difficult for a particular group to gain assis-
tance from the government if it requires them to use a more bur-
densome method than is normally available to others. For in-
stance, under the Court's theory, a city ordinance prohibiting the
award of municipal contracts to relatives of councilpersons would
make it more difficult for the group of relatives to get city con-
tracts, and hence, would be a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Persons related to members of the council would have to
appeal to the state legislature to get the benefit of city contracts.9
In Romer an evaluation of all six factors led the Court to con-
clude that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 w
389. See id. at 1626.
390. See id. at 1628.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. Id.
394. See id.
395. See id.
396. See id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia used this illustration to
show the "terminal silliness" of the majority's holding. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
397. See id. at 1629.
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However, it is not clear if one of these six factors is more signifi-
cant than another. Equally uncertain is whether any one factor
may be used independently. Several reasons counsel against the
independent use of these factors. First, the Court did not formally
base its analysis of Amendment 2 on these factors. Instead, these
factors have been deduced from the Court's opinion as implicitly
forming the basis of the Court's holding. Second, the factors lack
the degree of refinement necessary to be considered rules of con-
stitutional law. They are based on subtleties and nuances warrant-
ing additional explanation by the Court.
C. Future Applications of the Romer Doctrine
Because the Court never formally spoke in terms of the six
factors enunciated above, it is fair to conclude that they are not to
be deemed independent and sufficient rules of constitutional law
that can be freely imported into other factual situations. To the
contrary, the interrelatedness of the six identified factors suggests
that they should be employed in conjunction with each other. The
Court would probably not find a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause merely on the basis of one of the six factors. For instance,
the Court would unlikely find an equal protection violation merely
because the state has a weak interest or because the law makes it
more difficult for one group to receive assistance from the gov-
ernment.
The Romer decision may well represent the Court's first at-
tempt at reformulating the equal protection framework to reflect
the dual goals of ensuring substantive analysis and fairness. As
such, the Court seems to be moving toward a balancing approach
very similar in substance to that of Justice Marshall's.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The criticism commentators have levied against the Romer
opinion is well founded. The holding is incoherent and conclusory.
Much of Romer's confusion stems from the fact that the Court was
disingenuous in its purported analysis under rational basis review.
Amendment 2 is constitutional under a true rational basis review.
The amendment classified homosexuals in order to maintain tra-
ditional majoritarian morality. Prohibiting homosexuality from
constituting the basis of preferential treatment is a rational way of
preventing the deterioration of traditional values. The Court con-
cluded otherwise.
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Three alternative theories possibly account for the Court's in-
consistency within the existing structure of equal protection re-
view. The per se,398 rational basis with teeth, and multifactor, slid-
ing-scale theories strive to place the Romer decision within the
existing framework of equal protection review. Yet, not one of the
three theories singularly and comprehensively accounts for the
opinion. The difficulty in reconciling Romer with current stan-
dards of review appears to indicate a change in the Court's phi-
losophy regarding the equal protection guarantee.
The Romer decision evinces a move towards a balancing ap-
proach. Two basic concepts seem to motivate the Court to move
in this direction: (1) the need for deeper and more substantive
equal protection review and (2) the desire to achieve greater fair-
ness under the Equal Protection Clause. The Romer Court implic-
itly employed a set of six factors to effectuate these twin goals.
However, these factors by no means constitute a workable stan-
dard, ready for application in other contexts. At best, they repre-
sent the Court's first attempt at formulating a new standard.
Inevitably, there comes a time when the traditional shapes,
forms, and tools of the past no longer fit the concepts of the future.
Mounting tension marks the period leading up to the climactic
moment when the old paradigm is replaced by the new. Romer
represents this period of flux. In effect, the Court is moving
toward an expansion of the equal protection guarantee. But this is
an arena in which the Court should move with forethought and
deliberation.
The Equal Protection Clause is not a promise of absolute
equality, and the need for equality must be balanced against the
structures of our Constitution. The traditional, judicially created
equal protection framework is built on deference and functions to
prevent the overstepping of constitutional checks and balances.
Thus, there is significant danger in expanding protection under the
equal protection guarantee, for in doing so, the Court may im-
permissibly interfere with the power of the states and the will of
the people.
The Romer Court should have been more attuned to this dan-
ger or at a minimum should have allayed concerns of judicial abuse
by explaining its movements. But the Court's greatest shortcom-
398. Tribe's abstract per se theory does not technically form a part of the current
framework. However, the theory is relevant in that it attempts to show that histori-
cally his advocated approach was part of the equal protection notion.
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ing was its unwillingness to articulate or explain the changes being
made to the equal protection standards of review. In essence, in
the process of reviewing Amendment 2, the Court not only failed
to establish a new, principled standard but also destabilized and
muddled the existing framework of equal protection review.
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